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In this paper we study the question of debt sustainability from a risk management perspective. The
debt accumulation equation for any country involves variables that are stochastic and closely
intertwined. When these aspects are taken into consideration the notion of debt sustainability is
expanded to studying the stochastic properties of the debt dynamics. We illustrate the methodology
by studying the Brazilian case. We find that even though the debt could be sustainable in the absence
of risk, there are paths in which it is clearly unsustainable. Furthermore, we show that properties of
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There are several ways to assess debt sustainability. A widely used criterion is the gap 
between the actual primary budget deficit and the one required to keep the debt GDP 
ratio stable (the “debt stabilizing primary balance”).
1 This measure has several 
drawbacks: since the purpose of having debt in the first place is to smooth consumption, 
why would a country want to keep the debt to GDP ratio constant? Or, if a country is 
excessively heavily indebted, to keep the debt to GDP ratio would not be sustainable. 
 
Other measures have been proposed. IMF (2003) estimates the fiscal reaction function. 
The idea is similar to estimate the coefficient of the expected inflation in a Taylor rule, 
and check whether it exceeds one, as required for the rule to provide a stationary 
inflation. In the fiscal reaction function, the aim is to estimate how the primary balance 
reacts to increases in the debt to GDP ratio. Another measure is to compute a ratio 
between the actual debt level and a benchmark level equal to the present value of future 
primary surpluses computed under conservative assumptions. If the ratio exceeds one, the 
country would be over borrowing (IMF 2003). 
 
Risk based measures of fiscal sustainability have been borrowed from the financial 
literature. One of them is the very famous Value-at-Risk (V@R). Other sustainability 
measures include stress testing through Monte Carlo simulations.
2 
 
Here we propose a related measure that takes very seriously the realization that the debt 
accumulation equation for any country involves variables that are stochastic and closely 
intertwined. By taking these aspects into consideration, the notion of debt sustainability is 
expanded to studying the stochastic properties of the debt dynamics. We propose a VAR 
(Vector Auto Regression) to estimate the correlation pattern of the macro variables and 
use it to implement Monte Carlo simulations. These simulations allow us to compute 
“risk probabilities”, i.e., probabilities that the simulated Debt to GDP ratio exceeds a 
given threshold deemed risky (say, 75% of GDP).
3 The time-series of such probabilities 
is then used to investigate whether or not it is correlated with the market risk assessment, 
measured by the spread on sovereign dollar denominated debt. The application of our 
methodology for Brazil shows that even though the debt could be sustainable in the 
absence of risk, there are paths in which it is clearly unsustainable. Furthermore, we show 
that properties of the debt dynamics are closely related to the EMBI+ Brazil spread. 
 
Next Section describes the data used and performs a few debt decomposition exercises. 
Section III presents the core methodology and the application to Brazilian data. Section 
IV concludes. 
                                                 
1   See IMF (2003), p. 124, for references. 
2   Garcia (2002) computes a V@R for the Brazilian debt and performs Monte Carlo simulations to 
implement a CF@R (cash-flow at risk). 
3   For a financial institution, this probability would be analogous to the probability of wiping out the 
net worth. II. Brazilian Sovereign Debt 
A. Data Description 
 
The simulation of the debt dynamics requires the compatibility of many statistics that are 
produced in different places. Bevilaqua and Garcia (2002) performed a decomposition 
exercise of the growth sources of the domestic bonded debt in Brazil.  The domestic 
bonded debt is the component of the net public debt that grew the most: from 11.81% of 
GDP in December, 1994 to 48.95% of GDP in September, 2003. Here, we use a similar 
framework to decompose the sources of growth of the Brazilian net debt. 
 
To put together the data was not a straightforward task, and it took us a few months and 
many interactions with the Brazilian Central staff to clean the data and adapt them to the 
format required in the simulations.
4 Currently, these data are all available at the Brazilian 
Central Bank web page (www.bcb.gov.br). 
 
We now briefly describe the data. We use debt stocks (domestic, foreign; gross and net) 
monthly series. These stocks are converted to ratios of GDP using the “valorized” GDP,
5 
which are used to compute all ratios of GDP that we use in this paper. The PSBR (public 
sector borrowing requirements) are computed in three different concepts: primary, 
operational and nominal. We favor the use of the operational and primary concepts, 
which mitigate the effects of high inflation, because our sample contains the immediate 
aftermath of the Real plan, when the inflation came down from almost 50% per month. 
Massive distortions (see Figure 2 A) show up in the nominal deficit figures immediately 
succeeding the Real plan starting point (July 1, 1994) because we use twelve-month-
moving averages to provide comparability and avoid excessive fluctuation.
6 With the 
moving averages, until a full year had elapsed, the distortionary effects of the 
hyperinflation still contaminated the nominal deficit figures.
7 
 
Two main adjustments have to be taken into consideration in order to make the debt 
statistics compatible with the PSBR’s. First, privatization revenues have the (accounting) 
effect of reducing the debt, but are not computed as fiscal revenues for purposes of 
calculating the PSBR. Second, many expenditures incurred in the present are results of 
                                                 
4   Box 3.1 (Data on Public Debt in Emerging Market Economies) of the last World Economic 
Outlook (IMF 2003) describes the many difficulties involved in gathering such data. 
5   The “valorized” GDP is a better measure than the nominal GDP because, even under moderate 
inflation, the simple addition of the GDP flow within a twelve-month period distorts the statistic. For 
example, for a 10% yearly inflation, each unit of domestic currency of the last month will be worth 1.1 
units of domestic currency of the first month included in the sample. The “valorization” procedure 
mitigates this distortion. Under zero inflation, the “valorization” procedure reverts to usual addition of 
monthly GDP flows. Box 3.1 of the World Economic Outlook (IMF 2003) comments on the effects of such 
procedure, grossly exaggerating them. 
6   Since the deficits are so important to determine debt sustainability, we opted to use twelve-month-
moving averages instead of monthly figures. This is because the latter series is very volatile, often changing 
signs. For example, if some expenses were concentrated in a given month, the monthly series would show a 
large deficit among many surpluses, while the moving average would better reflect the fiscal stance. 
7   See Figure 2. previous contingent liabilities that eventually materialized. These “skeletons” have the 
(accounting) effect of increasing the debt, but are not computed as fiscal outlays for 
purposes of calculating the PSBR.
8 
 
The remaining data used are standard. Inflation is measured through the CPI (IPCA) and 
WPI (IGP-M) indices. Domestic interest rates are measured by the Selic rate.
 9 The 
country risk is measured through the EMBI and EMBI + Brazil indices produced by JP 
Morgan. Exchange rates are the month-end PTAX. 
B. Decomposition of debt shocks 
Figure 1 displays the evolution of the net debt to GDP ratio since 1994. A few months 
after the start of the Real Plan, the net debt to GDP ratio started to grow almost 
monotonically from the 30% level, reaching levels above 60% during the 2002 financial 
and political crisis, and currently hovering around 58%. This very fast growth is deemed 
the most important fragility in Brazilian macroeconomic indicators. To be sure, although 
some contend that the level of the net debt could be high given investors collective 
behavior,
10 the net debt to GDP ratio in Brazil is not particularly high among nations. The 
total (probably gross) debt averages 70% of GDP for emerging market economies (IMF 
2003, p. 116). However, the speed it increased (doubled from 30% to 60% in eight years), 
i.e., the “debt velocity”, is unambiguously very concerning. 
 
FIGURE 1 





















































































































































































































































Hypothetical Net Debt without Skeletons
Hypothetical Net Debt without Skeletons and Privatizations
Hypothetical Net Debt without Skeletons, Privatizations and Exchange-Rate Devaluations
 
                                                 
8   Other minor adjustments have to be performed in order to make the debts statistics compatible 
with the PSBR’s, as explained in Bevilaqua and Garcia (2001). 
9   The equivalent of the US Fed funds rate. 
10   For the “debt intolerance” phenomenon, see Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) and IMF 
(2003).  
The fiscal situation that generated such tremendous growth in the net debt to GDP ratio is 
displayed in Figure 2 A. The operational and primary deficit measures clearly show the 
fiscal stance deterioration after the first quarter of 1995. As explained earlier, the nominal 
deficit cannot be used to make any inference during the first year of the Real plan 
because it is still heavily contaminated by the previous very large inflation rates. It is only 
after October, 1998
11 that the fiscal stance improves. 
 
FIGURE 2 A 
 























































































































































































































































PSBR - nominal deficit (% GDP)  PSBR - nominal deficit (valorized) (% GDP)  PSBR - primary deficit (% GDP)
PSBR - primary deficit (valorized) (%GDP) PSBR - operational deficit (% GDP) PSBR - operational result (valorized) (% GDP)
 
 
However bad during the period 1995-1998, the fiscal stance is not the sole responsible for 
the doubling of the net debt to GDP ratio. Many other factors influenced the behavior of 
the debt. Bevilaqua and Garcia (2001), analyzing the increase in the bonded public debt 
during the period 1995-2000, pointed out that extremely high interest payments were the 
main culprits of the debt explosion.
12 It has been a matter of great discussion in Brazil 
how much of the high interest rates were endogenously determined by the weak fiscal 
stance. On one corner, the economists at Central Bank during the first term of President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso argued that to keep inflation at bay they had to maintain a 
very high real interest rate given the weak fiscal stance. On the opposite corner, other 
economists argued that interest rates were kept that high only to maintain the 
(overvalued) exchange rate. One interpretation is that during good times (between the 
                                                 
11   Although correlation does not imply causation, the change in the fiscal stance was simultaneous to 
the agreement with the IMF. 
12   Here, we use the primary deficit as a measure of the fiscal stance, according to the usual practice 
of successful stabilization programs (see Missale, Giavazzi and Benigno 2000). This is because the nominal 
(and, in lesser measure, real) interest payments are determined by many factors and may hinder the actual 
changes in the fiscal stance. Mexican crisis and the Asian crisis, and for a few months between the end of the Asian 
crisis and the start of the Russian crisis), interest rates were kept above what was required 
by covered interest parity to fight inflation. Figure 2 B displays the behavior of two 
measures of country (Brazil) risk, one constructed with external debt yield (C-Bond yield 
minus the yield of the T-bill of equivalent duration) and the other constructed with the 
domestic one-year interest rate (the covered interest parity differential).
13 In those  
tranquil periods before the floatation of the real (January 1999), to avoid the inconsistent 
trinity, controls on capital inflows were put in place so that the restrictive monetary 
policy could be undertaken.
14 In bad times, i.e., periods of high risk aversion in 
international financial markets, interest rates were raised even higher to avoid capital 
outflows which would kill the exchange-rate peg. In any case, it is only reasonable to 
assume that a tougher fiscal stance would have allowed a smaller real interest rate. On the 
other hand, had the peg ended before 1999, probably a lower real rate would have been 
paid during the intervening years. Therefore, when analyzing the debt decomposition 
exercises presented below, one has to bear in mind the stochastic relations between the 
variables, which lie at the heart of the simulation procedures presented in Section III. 
 
FIGURE 2 B 
 






































































































































































Covered-Interest-Parity Differential C-Bond Spread 
 
                                                 
13   Note that there are many differences between the domestic and the external bond whose yields are 
used to compute the two country risk measures, among them the much longer duration of the C-Bond. 
Nevertheless, the regularity pointed out remains valid. For details, see Garcia and Didier (2003). 
14   A description and an evaluation of the effectiveness of the capital controls on inflows is done in 
Garcia and Valpassos (2000).  See also Cardoso and Goldfajn (1998).  
Besides high interest payments, the so-called skeletons (contingent liabilities that turned 
sour) contributed significantly to the debt increase. Figure 1 shows the evolution of a 
hypothetical debt to GDP ratio had the skeletons not existed. The net debt to GDP ratio 
would have fallen by more than 6 p.p. of GDP had the skeletons not existed. On the other 
hand, had the government not privatized, the debt would have increased. The net effect of 
both privatizations and skeletons is negligible, as displayed in Figure 1 by the series 
“Hypothetical Net Debt without Skeletons and Privatizations.” Note that this a mere 
accounting exercise, not a counterfactual one.
15 
 
The effect of the devaluations can be seen in the series “Hypothetical Net Debt without 
Skeletons, Privatizations and Exchange-Rate Devaluations”. Again, since this is not a 
counterfactual exercise, the series has a downward bias. This is because lower interest 
rates accrued on public bonds denominated or indexed in US$ (vis-à-vis the non indexed 
ones) because of the forecasted devaluation and the currency risk. A flexible exchange 
rate regime would probably have required higher dollar rates, leading to higher net debt 
to GDP ratios along the counterfactual path. Despite these flaws, this series shows that 
the net debt to GDP ratio would hover around 37% by August 2003 had skeletons and 
privatizations being out of the picture, and the nominal exchange rate remained (à la 
chinoise) at par with the US$. 
 
The simulation procedure of Section III, among several uses, may also be used to perform 
a complete counterfactual exercise. For example, given the structures of correlations 
estimated by the VAR, by hypothesizing a different path for the primary deficit, one 
would also change the (endogenously determined) interest rates, affecting the debt both 
directly (through the primary deficit) and indirectly (through the interest payments).
16 
 
                                                 
15   For a counterfactual exercise, see Goldfajn and Guardia (2003). 
16   We will perform such full-blown counterfactual exercises in a future version. III.  Risk Management Approach 
 
In this section we evaluate the debt sustainability question from a risk management 
perspective. Most of the debt sustainability literature concentrates on the debt 
accumulation equation 
 
() t t t t t f d g r d + − + = − 1 1 
 
where   is the debt to GDP ratio, r  is the real interest rate paid,   is the growth rate of 
GDP, and   is the primary deficit. The idea in this equation is to determine the primary 
deficit or growth rate of GDP that would maintain the debt at certain level. This literature 
has been tremendously important in offering insights on the importance and timing of 
stabilization programs, as well as debt restructuring.




In this paper we recognize that the variables entering this equation are stochastic, and 
perhaps, correlated. Furthermore, we also consider the possibility that there are other 
external variables (such as the exchange rate and inflation rate) that could generate 
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where  t t t t t t s f g r π ε ~   and   , ~ , ~ ,
~
, ~ , ~  are the stochastic real interest rate, growth rate of GDP, 
primary deficit, debt shocks (skeletons (+) and privatizations (-)), the real exchange rate, 
and the inflation rate. We also assume that they are distributed multinomial
18 with 
conditional mean  t µ
r
, and conditional covariance matrix  .  t Σ
 
The risk management approach to debt sustainability is simply the characterization of the 
evolution of all the relevant stochastic variables and the calculation of the different debt 
paths. The idea is to estimate the conditional means and variances from the data and 
simulate the different paths of the debt – from those paths, we can compute the 
probability the debt will reach some level within some time and measure risk 
accordingly. 
 
The properties of the covariance matrix are important to debt sustainability. For example, 
in developed economies recessions (lower growth) are usually accompanied by a 
                                                 
17   For a review of the possible criteria to determine debt sustainability, see Chapter III of the 
September, 2003 World Economic Outlook (IMF 2003). 
18   We are assuming that the variables are normally distributed, even though some of them cannot be 
negative. This is a simplification that can be easily corrected in the Monte Carlo exercise. Here it is made 
mainly for expositional purposes. decrease in the interest rate (expansionary monetary policy). If this is the case, then the 
recession and the deterioration of the primary deficit – which are hurting the debt 
sustainability – comes with a reduction in the interest rate – which is helping debt 
sustainability. There is an automatic stabilizer in the equation. On the other hand, in 
emerging market economies, usually a recession deteriorates the fiscal accounts, 
increases the real interest rate, induces inflation and depreciates the exchange rate. If the 
sovereign debt is in dollars (which is usually the case), then all the variables are making 
the debt dynamics worse. Therefore, for emerging economies, the risk (covariance) part 
of debt sustainability becomes predominant, and simulations that postulate independent 




In this section we briefly discuss the procedure used to compute the debt dynamics. The 
variables considered are the following: real growth of GDP, real interest rate, the primary 
deficit measured as a share of GDP, the skeletons derived from the debt dynamics 
equation, the real exchange rate computed as the nominal depreciation minus inflation, 
and the inflation rate. All the data are monthly. 
 
To compute the debt shocks, or skeletons, we take the actual debt data and realizations of 
the growth rate and interest rates and compute 
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We then compute a VAR using the macro variables. One problem that might arise from 
using a VAR is that if the variables are non-stationary but cointegrated we should run a 
error correction model. Unfortunately the data we have is extremely short, and there is 
little hope that the standard tests are strong enough to produce a definite answer. Because 
we know that even in near unit root setups VAR’s produce consistent estimates (see 
Rothenberg and Stock (1997)) we decided to pursue this alternative. Therefore, the 
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where  t ν  are the reduced form residuals distributed multinomial with mean zero and 
covariance matrix Ω , and   are the coefficients of the lags. Using the Choleski 
decomposition of the reduced form residuals we generate several paths of the shocks and 
using the coefficients from the VAR we can compute the path of the variables in   - 
which can be used to estimate the path of the debt. 
() L B
t X
 This simple procedure uses Monte Carlo to determine several paths of the debt. It has 
several advantages: First, because we are not interested in estimating the 
contemporaneous causality between the macro variables, the VAR is used only to 
produce the best predictor on the joint dynamics of the macro variables. In other words, 
most applications on monetary policy are interested in computing impulse responses and 
identifying structural shocks from the reduced form. In this paper this is not our 
objective, although in Section III.D below we will compute some impulse responses. 
However, to understand the dynamics of the macro variables – or better said – to describe 
it, the only requirement is to produce the contemporaneous correlation as the result of 
some Choleski decomposition. Indeed, any Choleski decomposition (meaning any 
ordering of the variables in the VAR) will produce the same reduced form covariance 




Second, the procedure can be used to estimate rolling regressions – that will be used to 
assess the predictive power of the model and perform out of sample tests. This also 
allows us to estimate the model using the most recent conditions to compute different 
debt dynamics. Finally, this allows us to compare how different exchange rate regimes 
might impact the debt sustainability by concentrating only on the correlation structure. 
 
Third, variables and shocks that are not part of the debt accumulation equation still can 
have an impact on the debt dynamics. For example, the exchange rate, the terms of trade, 
and inflation can be included as variables in the VAR and analyze their impact on the 
debt.  
 
Finally, even if variables are not included, it is possible that the VAR could summarize 
their effect. For example, if terms of trade is not included but their impact on the debt 
dynamic is going to show up either as output, inflation or a real exchange rate 
depreciation, then the fact that it has been excluded from the VAR does not mean that its 
effect is not included – or summarized – in the variance covariance matrix of the reduced 
form residuals. 
B. Debt sustainability 
 
In this section we present the results from estimating the procedure described previously 
to the case of Brazil. There are several aspects that are important in the estimation - such 
as the choice of the relevant interest rate – that are discussed in detail. Furthermore, we 
studied the sensitivity of the results to changes in some of the assumptions.  
 
The variables we included are: (i) total net debt; (ii) GDP and GDP growth – which were 
computed from the 12 months “valorized” GDP; (iii) the real interest rate was computed 
                                                 
19   The intuition is that the covariance matrix of the reduced form can have several triangular 
factorizations – which in the VAR language it means that they have different orderings. There are as many 
triangular factorizations as the factorial of the number of variables (or columns of the matrix), which 
corresponds to the number of different permutations of the variables. Each factorization recovers – by 
definition – the original matrix but implies different Choleski decompositions. as the Selic rate minus the inflation in the WPI; (iv) the primary deficit is the “valorized” 
deficit divided by the “valorized” GDP; (v) the real exchange rate change was computed 
as the change in the nominal Real – US Dollar exchange rate minus the inflation rate 
(WPI);
20 (vi) and finally, the inflation rate used is the monthly WPI.
21 
 
The first step is to compute the skeletons and estimate the VAR using the six variables. 
The point estimates of the VAR are of little interest, so not shown here, the covariance of 
the reduced form residuals, on the other hand, deserves special attention. 
 
Table 1 
Covariance and correlation matrix 
       R e a l      
  Real  Real    Exchange    Nominal 
 Interest  Growth  Primary  Debt  Rate    Inflation 
 Rate  Rate  Deficit  Shocks  Depreciation  (WPI) 
Real  Interest  Rate    1.9249 0.5218 0.4930  -0.8032  -0.1197 4.4742 
Real Growth Rate   35.2% 1.1388 0.3883  -0.1694  2.6442  -2.2608 
Primary Deficit   17.8%  18.2%  3.9911 -3.5271  1.6101 -1.9419 
Debt Shocks  -25.5%  -7.0%  -77.7% 5.1605  -1.6374  -0.8513 
Real Exchange Rate Depreciation  -1.0%  28.6%  9.3%  -8.3% 74.8589  -14.2580 
Nominal Inflation (WPI)  34.8%  -22.8%  -10.5%  -4.0%  -17.8% 86.0028 
  
In Table 1, we show the covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals on the upper 
triangular, and on the lower triangular we show the correlations (highlighted). Some 
patterns of correlation are worth emphasizing. First, the primary deficit is positively 
associated with the real interest rate and the growth rate. These correlations are 
compatible with the standard Keynesian fiscal multiplier effects. Second, the inflation 
rate is positively correlated with the real interest rate, and negatively correlated with the 
growth rate. As we mentioned before, in emerging markets it is common that inflation 
scares are recessionary and increase the real interest rates. Furthermore, notice that the 
inflation rate is negatively correlated with the real exchange rate but the pass through is 
less than one to one given that the correlation is quite small. Third, a real exchange rate 
depreciation is associated with an increase in the fiscal deficit (the correlation is small but 
positive), but an increase in growth. Remember that these correlations reflect partial 
correlations and therefore in this discussion, the real exchange rate depreciation is 
assumed to have happened without inflation. In other words, this is a true real exchange 
rate depreciation and therefore expansionary in terms of output. On the other hand, most 
of the actual depreciations we observe in Brazil are accompanied by both the change in 
the real exchange rate and an increase in the inflation rate. In this case, the first 
movement increases output, while the second one would reduce it. The final effect has to 
be computed by looking at impulse responses. See Section III.D below. 
 
                                                 
20   Since the US inflation has very low variance in the sample, we exclude it from the real exchange 
rate calculation. In our framework, the constant term in the regression takes care of the effect of the US 
inflation on the real exchange rate. 
21   We also computed the model using the CPI and no difference on the main message was found.  Before concentrating on impulse responses, which are sensitive to the ordering of the 
variables in the VAR, we study the implications of the correlation structure on the debt. 
To compute the debt path we need to determine the initial conditions, i.e. what is the 
initial primary deficit, interest rate, growth rate, etc? To simplify the analysis we have 
decided to use the average of these variables the previous 9 months. We estimated the 
same path using only 6 months, and extending to 12 and 24 months. The results are 
almost unaltered by this assumption – hence we use 9 months to determine the initial 
conditions and all the data available up to that point to estimate the VAR and the 
covariance matrix.. 
 
In Figure 3, we present the debt path using the initial conditions computed at the end of 
September of 2002. In other words, we compute the debt accumulation equation using the 
inflation rate, interest rate, primary deficit, growth rate of the previous 9 months, and the 
final debt, the path of future debt assuming those variables remain constant is depicted in 
Figure 3. This is the path for the following 30 months.  
 
Figure 3 
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Notice that starting from almost 60 percent debt, the debt would gradually fall to just 
above 50 percent of GDP 30 months hence. It is possible to conclude from this exercise 
that the debt in Brazil given the value of the current macroeconomic variables is 
sustainable. However, this would be the wrong conclusion. Indeed, we perform the 
Monte Carlo exercise and show in Figure 4 the path of the debt, the maximum and 
minimum debt, the 95 and 5 percent bands, and the standard deviation of the debt to GDP 
ratio are shown. 
 Figure 4 
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The standard deviation of the debt to GDP ratio is measured in the right hand side scale, 
while all the other variables are measured on the left hand.
22  
 
There are several important points that can be extracted from Figures 3 and 4. First, it is 
the case that the debt on average is falling, as the standard debt sustainability exercise 
would imply. Second, there is a non-trivial proportion of realizations in which the debt 
increases to more than 70 percent – a level of debt that would be considered extremely 
large for an emerging market.
23 Remember that the horizon of study is only two and a 
half years and the debt to GDP reaching 80 percent in that period reflects a very fast 
accumulation when we consider we are starting from less than 60 percent and the means 
of the stochastic variables is pointing to a debt reduction. Third, the volatility of the debt 
to GDP ratio is increasing through time. It is easy to show that the debt to GDP ratio has 
a variance that is increasing faster than the one implied from a random walk. In other 
words, the variance T periods ahead is larger than T times the variance of one period 
ahead. In other words, the variance is increasing not only because simulation period is 
longer, but because the covariance matrix is such that the opposite of a diversification 
effect arises. This is the opposite of the automatic stabilizer effect that exists in developed 
economies, as mentioned earlier. 
 
In Figure 5 we present the standard deviation of the debt adjusted by the horizon. Here 
we present the simulations for the next 4 years. As can be seen, after one year, the 
volatility increases more than proportionally to time. This is the result found in several of 
the simulations; the real interest rate in some of them is larger than the growth rate of 
output generating an exploding debt path.  
                                                 
22   The shocks are zero the first two periods because the VAR was estimated using 2 lags. 
23   See Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003).  
 
Figure 5 
















C. Debt sustainability and sovereign spreads 
 
In the previous section we studied the properties of the debt 30 months after the current 
situation. In this section, we repeat this exercise for each month starting in January of 
2001. The idea is to compute the VAR with the available data up to month t, and compute 
the path of the debt afterwards for 10 years. Using those paths we can compute an 
statistic on the debt – lets say the probability that the debt to GDP ratio is larger than 75 
percent. Then we can repeat the exercise for month t+1. This rolling exercise produces a 
path for several statistics of the debt. 
 
In Figure 6 we present the results for the probabilities of reaching a debt larger than 66, 
75, 85, 95 and 100 percent of GDP in the following 10 years. The interpretation of this is 
the following. For example, assume that we are estimating these probabilities for June of 
2002. Using all the data until May of 2002 we estimate the VAR, the covariance matrix 
of the shocks, and generate the Monte Carlo simulations (500 replications of 120 
months). With the simulated paths we compute the debt for each of them using the debt 
accumulation equation and the estimates from the VAR. Then we compute the number of 
times the debt reaches some threshold (say, 75 percent of GDP) in any month of the next 
10 years. Hence, for June of 2002, given the initial conditions at that time, the real 
interest rate and the covariance matrix estimated until the previous month, the probability 
of a debt to GDP ratio larger than 75 percent is 79 percent, while it has a 59 percent 
chance of being larger than 100 percent of GDP. In other words, at that time it is clear 
that the situation existing in Brazil implies a very risky path of the debt. In other times, 
such as in May or June of 2003, these probabilities are much smaller. The exercise 
performed here is akin to a stress test. Figure 6 
 Probability of debt to GDP ratio reaching more than threshold  
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It is important to mention that in order to construct these paths we are using only 
information from the past. Hence this is an out-of-sample exercise. The idea is to 
compare one of these paths with the the EMBI+ yield. Figure 7 shows the results. 
 
Figure 7 
Probability of total debt to be larger than 75 percent of GDP at any time in the following 
























































































As can be seen in Figure 7, the probability and the spread on the EMBI are closely 
related. First, our procedure is out-of-sample in the sense that to compute the probability 
in month t, we use only information until time t-1, and we compare the probability with 
the average interest rate on the EMBI on month t.  
 The correlation between these two series is 54 percent on levels and 33 percent in 
changes.   
 
A simple regression analysis shows that our variable has strong predictive power on the 
future EMBI+ spreads. A simple AR(2) model produces 
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where   is the change in the EMBI+ spread, and   is the probability that the debt 
reaches some threshold in our Monte Carlo exercises. As can be seen the probabilities are 
significant – even though they have been computed with data before the month where the 
change in the EMBI is taking place. The R square of the regression is economically 
important: 56 percent. In fact, the AR(2) without the probability measures has only one of 
coefficient significant (∆ ) and an R square of 38 percent. Indeed, the simple F tests 
show that the p-value of the significance of the lagged  changes in the EMBI+ spread is 
8.9 percent (H0: the coefficients on the two lagged changes in the EMBI+ spread are 
zero), and 2.2 percent for the probabilities lags (H0: the coefficients on the two lagged 
probabilities are zero). 
t s ∆ t p
1 − t s
 
We interpret these results as a strong corroboration that our methodology captures the 
bulk of market perception of the default risk in Brazilian sovereign debt, and that such 
risk measure is largely correlated with the Brazilian risk spread. We therefore think that 
theses probabilities constitute an alternative, very effective, method to assess debt 
sustainability. 
 
D. Impulse responses 
 
One of the advantages of the previous procedure evaluating the path of the debt is that we 
do not have to commit ourselves to a particular structural model or distribution of the 
residuals. This is crucial in countries such as Brazil because the standard triangular 
assumption imposed in monetary economy is rarely satisfied. It is hardly the case that 
decisions of monetary policy in a particular month do not affect prices, output, or 
exchange rates contemporaneously. 
 
The previous analysis, by concentrating on the contemporaneous covariance of the 
residuals, allows us to study the path of the debt to the typical mixture of shocks that have 
hit the Brazilian economy. The only property imposed is that they have to satisfy the 
covariance matrix computed in the sample. 
 
However, looking at the mixture of shocks does not always provide the best description. 
For example questions such as what is the impact of a depreciation of the exchange rate 
on the path of the debt cannot be answered. In this section, we will impose a triangular 
decomposition of the reduced form shocks, even though we believe that it may be a poor 
description of what really takes place in the Brazilian economy. Nevertheless, this exercise will provide some intuition about the behavior of the debt, but it is always 
subject to the critique that it depends crucially on the identification assumptions. This is 
an important limitation but unfortunately this is the best we can do with the available 
data. 
 
In particular, we will assume that the ordering of the equations is as follows: real interest 
rate, GDP growth rate, primary fiscal deficit, skeletons, real exchange rate, and inflation. 
This order implies that inflation affects all the variables contemporaneously, while the 
real interest rate only acts with a lag. 
 
Figure 8.1 
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In Figure 8.1 to 8.6 we present the impulse responses of all the shocks plus the implied 
debt accumulation. The impulse response of each of the shocks is computed using the 
Choleski decomposition and the estimates from the VAR. The impulse response of the 
debt accumulation is calculated using the response of each of the shocks, the initial 
conditions at the end of the sample, and the debt accumulation equation. 
 
In Figure 8.1 the impulse response to a one standard deviation increase in the real interest 
rate is depicted. As can be seen, the increase in the real interest rate is quite persistent and 
it lasts around 10 months. Notice that the increase in the real interest rate depreciates the 
real exchange rate and reduces the inflation rate. It has a small impact on the growth rate 
and the primary deficit. The net effect on the debt path is that an increase in the real 
interest rate increases the debt to GDP ratio, and according to our simulation and the 
given initial conditions, the debt keeps on growing for a long period of time even after 
the variables have returned to steady state. 
 
 Figure 8.2 
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In Figure 8.2, the impulse response to a one standard deviation increase on the growth 
rate of output is depicted. As can be seen, the increase in the growth rate is associated 
with a contemporaneous increase in the real interest rate but subsequent reductions, a 
reduction in inflation rate, and a small real exchange rate appreciation.  
 
In the end, the path of the debt reflects a permanent improvement. Notice that even when 
the variables are close to the steady state, the debt is almost constant at a lower level. One 
surprising result, at least to us, is the fact that the primary deficit is almost unaffected by 
the output increase. It is possible that this is the result of the bad identification, but also it 
could reflect that in the sample output increases are associated with expansionary fiscal 
policy. 
 
Figure 8.3 looks at the impulse response after an increase in the primary deficit. In this 
case, the increase in the primary deficit is associated with a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate, an increase in the inflation rate, an increase in the interest rate, and a 
transitory increase in the growth rate. The shock and the first three reactions should 
deteriorate the debt to GDP ratio, but the increase in growth should improve it. In the 
end, our simulations show that the negative effects out-weight the positive ones and the 
debt to GDP ratio increases. In fact, in comparison to the previous two shocks, clearly the 
innovations to the primary deficit have the largest impact. 
 
These three impulse responses confirm quite well our intuition about the impact of these 
shocks on the path of the debt. We should expect that increases in the real interest rate 
and deteriorations of the primary deficit tend to increase the debt, while increases in the 
growth rate tend to improve it. It is not appropriate to judge the identification of shocks 















123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5 2 6 2 7 2 8 2 9 3 0













123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5 2 6 2 7 2 8 2 9 3 0




In Figure 8.4 we study the impact of an increase in the skeletons. Our simulations show 
that there is a transitory increase in the debt to GDP ratio followed by a decline. This 
impulse response is hard to reconcile with intuition. Indeed, from all our responses this is 
the most inconsistent one.  
 
In Figure 8.5 we depicted the impulse response to a real exchange rate depreciation. 
Before drawing any conclusions is important to remember that given our identification assumption this is a very particular form of depreciation. This is an exchange rate 
depreciation that is not accompanied by an increase in the inflation rate. In other words, 
this is a true real exchange rate depreciation. Increases in inflation rate, that could also 
cause a depreciation of the real exchange rate is the next shock. In other words, we can 
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Notice that – in line with our “good” depreciation interpretation – an increase in the real 
exchange rate is accompanied by an increase in the growth rate, a moderate increase in 
the interest rate (smaller than the growth rate), and a large improvement in the primary 
deficit. This is exactly the implications of a real depreciation rate that is expansionary.  
 
Because the increase in the growth rate is higher than the increase in the real interest rate 
in the end the debt to GDP ratio improves permanently. 
 
The final exercise is shown in Figure 8.6. In this case we study the impulse response to 
an increase in the inflation rate. Given the identification assumption it is possible to 
interpret this shock as a nominal shock that depreciates the exchange rate and increases 
the inflation rate at the same time. Indeed, in the impulse response it can be seen that the 
increase in inflation also depreciates the real exchange rate very significantly. 
Furthermore, the real interest rate increases on impact while the growth rate declines, and 
the primary deficit deteriorates. The movement of all the variables points out to a clear 
increase in the debt to GDP ratio, which in fact takes place. 
 It is important to remember that comparing the previous impulse responses the increase 
in the primary deficit and the increase in the inflation rate are the two most important 
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In this section we have made a big deal about the impulse responses and how the impact 
the path of the debt. It is important to reiterate what was mentioned in the introduction. 
The results in this section depend – crucially – on identification assumptions that are 
unlikely to be true in the data. With this caveat in mind, we still believe that something 
can be learned from the exercise. First, the comovement observed in the variables of 
interest and the debt dynamics are close to what our intuition would have predicted
24 
which is reassuring. Second, the magnitudes involved show that the most important 
shocks regarding the sensitivity of the debt to GDP ratio to the shock are innovations to 
the primary deficit and the inflation rate, where we have interpreted the innovations of 





The main contribution of this paper is to propose a risk based measure to assess debt 
sustainability. The main insight that lead to this measure is that debt in emerging market 
economies is quite risky. An increasingly larger number of models and body of empirical 
evidence show that emerging market economies lack the natural stabilizing features that 
allow and make countercyclical policies effective. For example, during a recession, real 
interest rates tend to fall in developed economies, which makes room for larger primary 
                                                 
24 Except for the skeletons. expenditures given the reduction in interest payments. In emerging market economies, 
often the reverse happens: real interest rate rises, government revenues fall and 
government outlays increase, thereby negatively leveraging the debt impact. 
 
The proposed measure is constructed from a framework that combines a statistical model 
to uncover the stochastic relations among the variables that directly or indirectly 
influence the debt accumulation with a simulation engine that computes future paths for 
the debt to GDP ratios. The Monte Carlo simulations allow us to compute “risk 
probabilities”, i.e., probabilities that the simulated Debt to GDP ratio exceeds a given 
threshold deemed risky (say, 75% of GDP). The time-series of such probabilities is then 
used to investigate whether or not it is correlated with the market risk assessment, 
measured by the spread on sovereign dollar denominated debt.  
 
The application of our methodology for Brazil shows that even though the debt could be 
sustainable in the absence of risk, there are many paths in which it is clearly 
unsustainable. I.e., although “on average” the Brazilian debt is sustainable, the correlation 
structure under which the Brazilian economy operates poses a huge question mark on the 
debt sustainability.  
 
We also show that properties of the debt dynamics are closely related to the EMBI+ 
Brazil spread. This is quite a remarkable result, since our methodology uses out-of-
sample simulations, and does not use regressors related to the risk aversion of 
international investors, as the high-yield spread in the US, which are deemed very 
important in the determination of the EMBI+ spread.  Thus, our measures constitute an 
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